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The simultaneous appearance in May 2003 of four books on the Riemann
hypothesis (RH) provoked these reflections. We briefly discuss whether the
RH should be added as a new axiom, or whether a proof of the RH might
involve the notion of randomness.
New pragmatically-justified mathematical ax-
ioms that are not at all self-evident
A pragmatically-justified principle is one that is justified by its many impor-
tant consequences—which is precisely the opposite of normal mathematical
practice.1 However this is standard operating procedure in physics.
Are there mathematical propositions for which there is a considerable
amount of computational evidence, evidence that is so persuasive that a
physicist would regard them as experimentally verified? And are these propo-
sitions fruitful? Do they yield many other signficant results?
Yes, I think so. Currently, the two best candidates2 for useful new axioms
of the kind that Go¨del and I propose [1] that are justified pragmatically as
in physics are:
• the P 6= NP hypothesis in theoretical computer science that conjec-
tures that many problems require an exponential amount of work to
resolve, and
1However new mathematical concepts such as
√−1 and Turing’s definition of com-
putability certainly are judged by their fruitfulness—Franc¸oise Chaitin-Chatelin, private
communication.
2Yet another class of pragmatically-justified axioms are the large cardinal axioms or
the axiom of determinacy used in set theory, as discussed in Mary Tiles, The Philosophy
of Set Theory, Chapters 8 and 9. For the latest developments, see Hugh Woodin, “The
continuum hypothesis,” AMS Notices 48 (2001), pp. 567–576, 681–690.
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• the Riemann hypothesis concerning the location of the complex zeroes
of the Riemann zeta-function
ζ(s) =
∑
n
1
ns
=
∏
p
1
1− 1
ps
.
(Here n ranges over positive integers and p ranges over the primes.)3
Knowing the zeroes of the zeta function, i.e., the values of s for which ζ(s) =
0, tells us a lot about the smoothness of the distribution of prime numbers,
as is explained in these four books:
• Marcus du Sautoy, The Music of the Primes, Harper Collins, 2003.
• John Derbyshire, Prime Obsession, Joseph Henry Press, 2003.
• Karl Sabbagh, The Riemann Hypothesis, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux,
2003.
• Julian Havil, Gamma, Princeton University Press, 2003.4
The Riemann zeta function is like my Ω number: it captures a lot of
information about the primes in one tidy package. Ω is a single real number
that contains a lot of information about the halting problem.5 And the RH
is useful because it contains a lot of number-theoretic information: many
number-theoretic results follow from it.
Of the authors of the above four books on the RH, the one who takes
Go¨del most seriously is du Sautoy, who has an entire chapter on Go¨del and
Turing in his book. In that chapter on p. 181, du Sautoy raises the issue
of whether the RH might require new axioms. On p. 182 he quotes Go¨del,6
3You start with this formula and then you get the full zeta function by analytic con-
tinuation.
4Supposedly Havil’s book is on Euler’s constant γ, not the RH, but ignore that. Sections
15.6, 16.8 and 16.13 of his book are particularly relevant to this paper.
5Ω =
∑
p halts
2−|p| is the halting probability of a suitably chosen universal Turing
machine. Ω is “incompressible” or “algorithmically random.” Given the first N bits of
the base-two expansion of Ω, one can determine whether each binary program p of size
|p| ≤ N halts. This information cannot be packaged more concisely. See [2], Sections 2.5
through 2.11.
6Unfortunately du Sautoy does not identify the source of his Go¨del quote. I have been
unable to find it in Go¨del’s Collected Works.
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who specifically mentions that this might be the case for the RH. And on
p. 202 of that chapter du Sautoy points out that if the RH is undecidable
this implies that it’s true, because if the RH were false it would be easy to
confirm that a particular zero of the zeta function is in the wrong place.
Later in his book, on pp. 256–257, du Sautoy again touches upon the
issue of whether the RH might require a new axiom. He relates how Hugh
Montgomery sought reassurance from Go¨del that a famous number-theoretic
conjecture—it was the twin prime conjecture, which asserts that there are
infinitely many pairs p, p + 2 that are both prime—does not require new
axioms. Go¨del, however, was not sure. In du Sautoy’s words, sometimes
one needs “a new foundation stone to extend the base of the edifice” of
mathematics, and this might conceivably be the case both for the twin prime
conjecture and for the RH.
On the other hand, on pp. 128–131 du Sautoy tells the story of the Skewes
number, an enormous number
1010
10
34
that turned up in a proof that an important conjecture must fail for ex-
tremely large cases. The conjecture in question was Gauss’s conjecture
that the logarithmic integral
Li(x) =
∫ x
2
du
ln u
is always greater than the number π(x) of primes less than or equal to x. This
was verified by direct computation for all x up to very large values. It was
then refuted by Littlewood without exhibiting a counter-example, and finally
by Skewes with his enormous upper bound on a counter-example. This raised
the horrendous possibility that even though Gauss’s conjecture is wrong, we
might never ever see a specific counter-example. In other words, we might
never ever know a specific value of x for which Li(x) is less than π(x). This
would seem to pull the rug out from under all mathematical experimentation
and computational evidence! However, I don’t believe that it actually does.
The traditional view held by most mathematicians is that these two as-
sertions, P 6= NP and the RH, cannot be taken as new axioms, and cannot
require new axioms, we simply must work much harder to prove them.
According to the received view, we’re not clever enough, we haven’t come
up with the right approach yet. This is very much the current consensus.
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However this majority view completely ignores7 the incompleteness phe-
nomenon discovered by Go¨del, by Turing, and extended by my own work [2]
on information-theoretic incompleteness. What if there is no proof?
In fact, new axioms can never be proved; if they can, they’re theorems,
not axioms. So they must either be justified by direct, primordial mathe-
matical intuition, or pragmatically, because of their rich and important
consequences, as is done in physics. And in line with du Sautoy’s observa-
tion on p. 202, one cannot demand a proof that the RH is undecidable before
being willing to add it as a new axiom, because such a proof would in fact
yield the immediate corollary that the RH is true. So proving that the RH is
undecidable is no easier than proving the RH, and the need to add the RH as
a new axiom must remain a matter of faith. The mathematical community
will never be convinced!8
Someone recently asked me, “What’s wrong with calling the RH a hy-
pothesis? Why does it have to be called an axiom? What do you gain
by doing that?” Yes, but that’s beside the point, that’s not the real issue.
The real question is, Where does new mathematical knowledge come
from?
By “new knowledge” I mean something that cannot be deduced from our
previous knowledge, from what we already know.
As I have been insinuating, I believe that the answer to this fundamental
question is that new mathematical knowledge comes from these three sources:
a) mathematical intuition and imagination (
√−1!),
b) conjectures based on computational evidence (explains calculations),
and
7As du Sautoy puts it, p. 181, “mathematicians consoled themselves with the belief that
anything that is really important should be provable, that it is only tortuous statements
with no valuable mathematical content that will end up being one of Go¨del’s unprovable
statements.”
8The situation with respect to P 6= NP may be different. In a paper “Consequences
of an exotic definition for P = NP,” Applied Mathematics and Computation 145 (2003),
pp. 655–665, N. C. A. da Costa and F. A. Doria show that if ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory + the axiom of choice) is consistent, then a version of P = NP is consistent
with ZFC, so a version of P 6= NP cannot be demonstrated within ZFC. See also T.
Okamoto, R. Kashima, “Resource bounded unprovability of computational lower bounds,”
http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/187/.
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c) principles with pragmatic justification, i.e., rich in consequences (ex-
plains other theorems).9
And items (b) and (c) are much like physics, if you replace “computational
evidence” by “experimental evidence.” In other words, our computations are
our experiments; the empirical basis of science is in the lab, the empirical
basis of math is in the computer.
Yes, I agree, mathematics and physics are different, but perhaps they are
not as different as most people think, perhaps it’s a continuum of possibil-
ities. At one end, rigorous proofs, at the other end, heuristic plausibility
arguments, with absolute certainty as an unattainable limit point.
I’ve been publishing papers defending this thesis for more than a quarter
of a century,10 but few are convinced by my arguments. So in a recent paper
[1] I’ve tried a new tactic. I use quotes from Leibniz, Einstein and Go¨del to
make my case, like a lawyer citing precedents in court. . .
In spite of the fact that I regard the Riemann hypothesis as an excellent
new-axiom candidate—whether Go¨del agrees or merely thinks that a new
axiom might be needed to prove the RH, I’m not sure—let me briefly wax
enthusiastic over a possible approach to a proof of the RH that involves
randomness. Disclaimer : I’m not an expert on the RH. What I’m about
to relate is definitely an outsider’s first impression, not an expert opinion.
A possible attack on the Riemann hypothesis?
Here is a concrete approach to the RH, one that uses no complex numbers.
It’s a probabilistic approach, and it involves the notion of randomness. It’s
originally due to Stieltjes, who erroneously claimed to have proved the RH
with a variant of this approach.
9A possible fourth source of mathematical knowledge is: d) probabilistic or statistical
evidence, i.e., a mathematical assertion that is deemed to be true because the probability
that it’s false is immensely small, say < 10−99999.
Here is a practical example of this: The fast primality testing algorithm currently used
in Mathematica does not necessarily give the correct answer, but mistakes are highly
unlikely. Algorithms of this sort are called Monte Carlo algorithms.
10See, for example, the introductory remarks in my 1974 J. ACM paper [3].
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The Mo¨bius µ function is about as likely to be +1 or −1 (see Derbyshire,
Prime Obsession, pp. 322–323).
µ(n) =
{
0 if k2 divides n, k > 1,
(−1)number of different prime divisors of n if n is square-free.
The RH is equivalent to assertion that as k goes from 1 to n, µ(k) is positive
as often as negative. More precisely, the RH is closely related to the assertion
that the difference between
• the number of k from 1 to n for which µ(k) = −1, and
• the number of k from 1 to n for which µ(k) = +1
is O(
√
n), of the order of square root of n, i.e., is bounded by a constant
times the square root of n. This is roughly the kind of behavior that one
would expect if the sign of the µ function were chosen at random using
independent tosses of a fair coin.11
This is usually formulated in terms of the Mertens function M(n):12
M(n) =
n∑
k=1
µ(k).
According to Derbyshire, pp. 249–251,
M(n) = O(
√
n)
implies the RH, but is actually stronger than the RH. The RH is equivalent
to the assertion that for any ǫ > 0,
M(n) = O(n
1
2
+ǫ).
Could this formula be the door to the RH?!
This probabilistic approach caught my eye while I was reading this May’s
crop of RH books.
I have always had an interest in probabilistic methods in elementary num-
ber theory. This was one of the things that inspired me to come up with my
11For a more precise idea of what to expect if the sign of the µ function were chosen at
random, see the chapter on the law of the iterated logarithm in Feller, An Introduction to
Probability Theory and Its Applications, vol. 1, VIII.5 through VIII.7.
12See [4, 5].
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definition of algorithmic randomness and to find algorithmic randomness
in arithmetic [6] in connection with diophantine equations. However, I doubt
that this work on algorithmic randomness is directly applicable to the RH.
In particular, these two publications greatly interested me as a child:
• Mark Kac, Statistical Independence in Probability, Analysis and Num-
ber Theory, Carus Mathematical Monographs, vol. 12, Mathematical
Association of America, 1959.
• George Po´lya, “Heuristic reasoning in the theory of numbers,” 1959,
reprinted in Gerald W. Alexanderson, The Random Walks of George
Po´lya, Mathematical Association of America, 2000.
I think that anyone contemplating a probabilistic attack on the RH via the
µ function should read these two publications. There is also some interest-
ing work on random sieves, which are probabilistic versions of the sieve of
Eratosthenes:
• D. Hawkins, “Mathematical sieves,” Scientific American, December
1958, pp. 105–112.
As Po´lya shows in the above paper—originally American Mathematical
Monthly 66, pp. 375–384—probabilistic heuristic reasoning can do rather
well with the distribution of twin primes. By the way, this involves Euler’s
γ constant. Can a refinement of Po´lya’s technique shed new light
on µ and on the RH? I don’t know, but I think that this is an interesting
possibility.
By the way, P 6= NP also involves randomness, for as Charles Ben-
nett and John Gill showed in 1981—SIAM Journal on Computing 10, pp.
96–113—with respect (relative) to a random oracle A, PA 6= NPA with
probability one [7].
Further reading—Four “subversive” books
• On experimental mathematics:
Borwein, Bailey and Girgensohn, Mathematics by Experiment, Experi-
mentation in Mathematics, A. K. Peters, in press.
(See [8]. There is a chapter on zeta functions in volume two.)
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• On a quasi-empirical view of mathematics:
Tymoczko, New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Prince-
ton University Press, 1998.
• On pragmatically-justified new axioms and information-theoretic in-
completeness:
Chaitin, From Philosophy to Program Size, Tallinn Cybernetics Insti-
tute, 2003.
(There is also an electronic version of this book [2].)
And regarding the adverse reaction of the mathematics community to the
ideas in the above four books, I think that it is interesting to recall Go¨del’s
difficulties at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study, as recounted in:
• John L. Casti, The One True Platonic Heaven, John Henry Press, 2003.
According to Casti, one of the reasons that it took so long for Go¨del’s ap-
pointment at the IAS to be converted from temporary to permanent is that
some of Go¨del’s colleagues dismissed his incompleteness theorem. Now of
course Go¨del has become a cultural icon13 and mathematicians take incom-
pleteness more seriously—but perhaps not seriously enough.
Mathematicians shouldn’t be cautious lawyers—I much prefer the bold
Eulerian way of doing mathematics. Instead of endlessing polishing, how
about some adventurous pioneer spirit? Truth can be reached through suc-
cessive approximations; insistence on instant absolute rigor is sterile—that’s
what I’ve learned from incompleteness.14
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